Abstract-Enabling unsubscribed Secondary User (SU) access through Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) techniques provides a huge opportunity to the Wireless Service Providers (WSPs) for achieving efficient radio spectrum usage as well as gain additional profits. This paper presents a novel and dynamic SU pricing model for implementation by the WSPs at their Base Stations (BSs) based upon a BS-centric distributed framework, that allows the SU price to vary dynamically with the changing radio spectrum usage at the BS. Assuming high competition among regional WSPs, a non-cooperative competition structure is considered among the WSPs, where neither information nor resources are shared among the WSPs. A simple single cell scenario easily scalable to multiple cells achieving competitive yet dynamic SU pricing among the BSs of two WSPs, is presented in this paper. The final SU price is seen to depend on the spectrum utilization at the BS, the wireless channel, and the price charged by WSPs to their Primary Users (PUs).
I. INTRODUCTION
Unbalanced utilization of the radio spectrum with respect to time and location coupled with huge investments by the Wireless Service Providers (WSPs) in acquiring the licensed spectrum, have a serious impact on the bottom line of the WSPs, and in turn on the price paid by the subscribers for wireless access. Enabling temporary wireless access to Secondary Users (SUs) through Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) techniques, provides the WSPs with an opportunity to not only improve the efficiency of radio spectrum usage but also earn additional profits from such SU access [1] , [2] .
To this effect, majority of the work in literature has focused on spectrum sharing techniques and SU pricing models based on a centralized approach, where a Centralized Mediating Entity (CME) such as a spectrum broker or a spectrum regulator pools the unutilized spectrum information from all the WSPs in the area [1] , [3] - [5] . This approach is envisioned to regulate, co-ordinate and lease the spectrum temporarily (hours) to either WSPs interested in temporarily increasing their capacity [3] , [4] , or directly to SUs requiring temporary wireless access [5] , [6] .
However, two primary difficulties can be foreseen considering the implementation of the centralized approaches described above involving CMEs. Firstly, radio spectrum usage characteristics are observed to vary with respect to time and location, thus leading to the requirement of multiple regional CMEs with increased signaling overhead for CME-WSP coordination. Secondly, considering the highly competitive multi-WSP environment, it can be considered unlikely for the WSPs to share their spectrum or spectrum related information.
In this paper, we present a methodology to implement the Base Station (BS)-centric distributed framework from [2] for achieving competitive yet dynamic SU pricing among the WSPs in a region, while simultaneously maximizing individual WSP profits from SU access. Since the analysis in this paper is based on the BS-centric distributed framework from [2] , the individual WSPs are assumed to operate without the presence of CMEs, and in a non-cooperative manner without any sharing of spectrum or spectrum related information. It must be noted that, the BSs are considered to be independent elements setting SU prices based on their local spectrum utilization, and act in the best interest of their respective WSPs.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section II introduces the BS-centric distributed framework and the dynamic incentive based SU pricing model [2] . Section III describes the methodology for achieving profitable yet competitive dynamic SU pricing among the WSPs in the area, without inter-WSP cooperation. Simulations and results showcasing the profitability potential to the WSPs from such SU access are presented in Section IV, with Section V highlighting the conclusions.
II. BS-CENTRIC DISTRIBUTED FRAMEWORK AND DYNAMIC SU PRICING
The BS-centric distributed framework [2] implemented in this paper considers enhanced BSs with the capability of providing direct temporary SU access, by conducting SU admission control and Primary User (PU)-SU resource allocation decisions based on their instantaneous spectrum usage characteristics. This distributed framework not only improves the instantaneous spectrum usage, but also reduces the heavy signaling overhead required in CME-WSP-BS coordination.
Every BS in this distributed framework broadcasts their local spectrum information (e.g., SU price per application class) to the SUs in the area. The SUs can therefore select the mostsuitable BS and potentially acquire temporary wireless access instantaneously directly from the BS, rather than waiting for the CME to negotiate and select a WSP, which in turn selects the most suitable BS to provide access to the SU. It must be noted that, the BS-centric distributed framework [2] allows temporary wireless access to SUs, if and only if, there remain surplus spectrum available at the BS after the all PUs (i.e., 978-1-4244-3574-6/10/$25.00 ©2010 IEEE Fig. 1 . Distributed framework for SU access [2] subscribers) have been satisfactorily served, thus guaranteeing no disruption to PU service. Figure 1 illustrates the BS-centric distributed framework based scenario, where a SU can potentially gain temporary wireless access from the BS of one of the three WSPs. The WSPs are assumed to have a single frequency network with an all-IP framework, where the unutilized spectrum at each BS can be made available to the SU in its coverage area.
A. Terminology: SU Pricing Model
Assuming the total spectrum at the BS to be 1 unit, the fraction of the spectrum utilized by PUs at BS i is denoted by α i,pu , while the unutilized spectrum available to the SUs is given by (1 − α i,pu ), as shown in Fig. 1 . The variable price charged to the SUs by the BSs (WSPs) for a particular application class (finite time t in seconds: delay sensitive applications, finite block of B bytes: delay insensitive applications) is known as the SU price and denoted by s i . The fixed price charged by the WSPs to the PUs for the same application class is referred to as the PU price denoted by p i .
Before detailing the SU pricing model, the terminology relevant to spectrum utilization at BS i is listed as follows: 
B. Dynamic Incentive based Pricing Model
The SU price s i is defined in terms of the fixed PU price p i and the SUF at the BS can be given as [2] 
where
, p i and m i are non-negative real numbers.
The term f i (α i,t ) is the normalized SU price with respect to (w.r.t.) the fixed p i and captures the variable nature of spectrum utilization at the BS. This term based on the log barrier function [7] , and has an inherent property for SU admission admission control. The normalized SU price is defined as
where n i is a positive real number representing the Incentive Cutoff Factor (ICF). The ICF is useful in defining the incentive in (2), such that when α i,t < α i,ic , we have s i < p i . The value of ICF is be obtained by solving (2) setting α i,t = α i,ic and f i (α i,t ) = 1 [2] . This incentive structure embedded into the SU pricing model, depends on the PU price, and allows the WSPs to attract more SUs during periods of low PU demand (off-peak hours) and discourages the SUs to join the network during periods of high PU demand (peak hours).
The exponent of f i (α i,t ) in (1) is a non-negative real number referred to as the Price Leveling Factor (PLF) denoted by m i , and provides additional flexibility to the WSPs for pricing the SUs. The PLF is used in the next section to set SU prices with the aim of maximizing individual WSP profits, considering inter-WSP competition and SU pricing incentives.
Assuming BS i . The SU pricing structure is calculated at BS i using (1) for a fixed time window T (e.g., 10 minutes) based on the predicted PU demand, and is then broadcasted to the SUs in the area. The SUs gaining access during this time window are priced opportunistically with the SU price being the lowest for the first SU and incrementing for every subsequent SU.
C. Multiple WSPs and Competitive Pricing
Considering PU service, the PUs pay a fixed price (per month, minute, bytes) for a given service (e.g., voice or data) to the WSPs. With multiple WSPs competing (no cooperation among WSPs) for a larger subscriber base, the PU prices set by each WSP can be seen to stabilize and fall into equilibrium, thus maximize individual WSP profits and providing no incentives to the WSPs for deviating from the set prices [8] .
Efficient spectrum utilization requires the WSPs not only to maximize their subscriber base (PUs), but also attract SUs to gain temporary access to the unutilized spectrum at their respective BSs. The WSPs would thus would compete with each other in a non-cooperative manner, with the goal of setting SU prices to maximize their individual profits from SU access. The dynamic SU pricing model allows the WSPs to provide incentives in price to attract the SUs during periods of low SUF, i.e., α i,pu < α i,t < α i,ic .
Although the PLF (m i ) provides flexibility to the WSPs to adjust their SU prices, obtaining equilibrium pricing among the WSPs with dynamically changing prices could be prohibitively complex. Therefore a methodology for achieving inter-WSP competitive yet dynamic SU pricing is developed in the next section, based on the linear city model and static SU pricing.
III. NON-COOPERATIVE COMPETITIVE SU PRICING
Assuming the BSs as individual entities acting on behalf of their respective WSPs, we consider a single cell scenario to initially find equilibrium SU prices considering static SU pricing. Calculation of these static equilibrium SU prices based on the linear city model will be the intermediate step in achieving non-cooperative competitive dynamic SU pricing.
A. Linear City Model
The linear city model assumes a city to be represented by a line of distance 1 unit with a single BS for each of the two competing WSPs placed on either side of the city, as shown in Fig. 3 . Since each of the two WSPs in the linear city scenario have only one BS, the same index i will be used for the WSPs, beyond this point in the paper. The unit distance on the linear city is represented by y ∈ [0, 1], and the BSs are assumed to be at a distance df i from the city, where df i is the exclusion region and depends on antenna configurations at the BS of WSP i . Hence the linear city extends from df 1 (y = 0) to the cell edge (y = 1) for WSP 1 and vice versa for WSP 2 .
For static SU pricing structure, we assume a fixed SU price S i to be charged by the WSPs to all the SUs, such that the SUs have a monetary incentive w.r.t. the PU price, i.e., S i < p i . The cost to each WSP for providing temporary wireless access to a single SU is assumed to be fixed and equal C = C 1 = Fig. 3 . SU service differentiation based on the linear city model C 2 . Thus from the profitability perspective of the WSPs, the equilibrium SU price S * i must satisfy C i < S * i < p i . It must be noted that the SU prices (S 1 , S 2 ) are assumed to be set simultaneously by the WSPs with the goal of individual profit maximization, without inter-WSP cooperation.
Price based competition among multiple sellers (i.e. WSPs) theoretically leads to equilibrium prices equaling to the costs, i.e., S * i = C i , thus resulting in zero profits to the sellers [8] , [9] . However, such a phenomenon is rarely observed in real markets, since the sellers always distinguish their service based on quality, brand, promotional offers, etc.. The differentiation of their own service from similar service by other WSPs in the region, creates a niche market for the WSPs, maximizing their individual profits as well as competing on prices.
The methodology for achieving competitive inter-WSP SU pricing is thus based on this intermediate step of fixed equilibrium pricing analysis with SU service differentiation based on the linear city model. The PLF (m i ) introduced in Section II can then be used to transform the fixed equilibrium SU prices into competitive yet dynamic SU prices.
A total of q SUs are assumed to be uniformly distributed along the linear city from 0 to 1, and each SU is required to select either of the two WSPs for temporary access. The BSs of the two WSPs are assumed to have sufficient unutilized spectrum in total for serving all the SUs on the linear city.
From the SU's perspective, selection of a WSP not only depends on the price but also on the signal strength at the SU terminal. Therefore the perceived price (monetary unit: '$') for a SU located at any point 'y' can be given as [9] 
where ζ is a constant nonnegative real number representing the dissatisfaction level of a SU. Observing (3), the perceived price to the SU for access to the BS of WSP i and hence the dissatisfaction level can be seen to increase as y increases.
B. SU Dissatisfaction Level ζ
In order to define the SU dissatisfaction level ζ in (3), we first define the Satisfaction Level (SL) denoted by τ i for the SUs w.r.t. the BS of WSP i . The SL τ i (r) for the r th SU on the linear city w.r.t. the BS of WSP i is defined in terms of the spectral efficiency η i (r) at the SU terminal as
Averaging out the shadowing, the maximum value of the spectral efficiency η i can be observed at df i , i.e., at y = 0 nearest to BS of WSP i . The standard deviation of the SLs from (4) is denoted by σ i , and can be used to represent the wireless channel on the linear city. The dissatisfaction level ζ can be considered as the reciprocal of the SL and can be defined as:
K 1 and K 2 are constants and nonnegative real numbers, and Δ(K 2 ) defines the unit change in the value of K 2 . With ζ defined, we now proceed to calculate the equilibrium SU prices with a static SU price (S i ) and fixed equal cost C.
C. Equilibrium Analysis: Static SU Pricing
For any SU located at a distance y from BS of WSP 1 as shown in Fig. 3 , the SU will select
either of the two WSPs is randomly selected [9] .
It could be possible for WSP 1 to capture the entire market by setting S 1 such that S 1 < S 2 −ζ, i.e., serve all the q SUs in the linear city. However, in context of the system framework and the assumptions described, due to limited quantity of spectrum in offer for the SUs, the entire SU demand cannot be satisfied by a single WSP. Also WSP 1 would need to know the SU price S 2 set by WSP 2 , which is contrary to our assumptions that SU prices are set simultaneously.
Therefore, to achieve competitive SU pricing, the WSPs will need to set their SU prices close to each other. From the SUs' perspective, the SUs will prefer to obtain access from the WSP with the lower SU price, since the SUs cannot be guaranteed Quality of Service (QoS) at all times as the BSs are required to allocate resources to satisfactorily serve the PUs first [2] . With the SU prices set to be close (or equal) to each other by the WSPs, the SUs will prefer to select the WSP with the lower perceived price thus gaining a higher SL.
We now focus on a SU located at a distance d on the linear city, such that U W SP,1 (d) = U W SP,2 (1 − d). Solving the equality for d, gives us the SU demand at WSP 1 as
is a nonnegative real number. The profit achievable by WSP 1 based on SU demand can be given as
where π 1 (S 1 , S 2 ) is a nonnegative real number. For profit maximization, WSP 1 's best response to the SU price set by WSP 2 can be obtained as
The model being symmetric for both the WSPs, a similar set of results can be obtained for WSP 2 . Thus assuming S 1 = S 2 , the Nash Equilibrium (NE) SU price can be expressed as
where S * is non-negative real number [9] .
D. Transformation to Dynamic SU Pricing
The PLF [2] described in Section II provides additional price adjustment flexibility to the incentive based dynamic pricing model, and therefore can be used to transform the static NE SU price into dynamic yet competitive SU pricing.
To implement the transformation, initially, the SU price to be paid by the first SU is adjusted to be equal to the static NE SU price obtained from (9) . The value of the PLF is obtained next by rearranging (1) and setting s i = S * i and α i,t = α i,pu . Finally, the PLF is substituted in (1) to obtain the new dynamic yet competitive SU pricing structure denoted by s i .
Thus it can be observed that incremental SU prices are charged to every new SU, depending upon the amount of unutilized spectrum available at the BS. Since the NE SU price is adjusted to be equal to SU price of the first SU and every subsequent SU pays a higher SU price, the WSPs are guaranteed profits from every SU.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
For analyzing the profitability potential for the WSPs, a single cell with no inter-cell interference is assumed for the linear city. The wireless channel is based on the urban macrocell scenario [10] , and the simulation parameters are defined in Table I . The carrier frequency of 2 GHz for WSP 1 and 1.9 GHz for WSP 2 is assumed giving a path loss of P L 1 = 128.1 + 37.6 log 10 (δ) and P L 2 = 127.7 + 37.6 log 10 (δ) respectively, where δ is the distance in meters. Every SUs entering BS i is randomly allocated either 400, 500 or 600 KHz, assuming the total bandwidth at BS i to be 20 MHz.
The simulation scenario considered in this paper assumes similar PU utilization at the BSs of the two WSPs and with symmetric incremental WSP costs. However, it must noted that, other scenarios with dissimilar PU utilization and asymmetric WSP costs can also be shown to achieve high inter-WSP competitive pricing.
The competitive nature of the dynamic SU prices can be quantified using the following inter-WSP competitiveness metric:
and VAR denotes the variance.
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The competitive nature with dynamic SU pricing can be observed in Fig. 4 , with the new SU price (s i ) curves for both WSPs seen to be very close to each other, in comparison to the original SU price (s i ) curves. The lower value of the metric ψ s 1 ,s 2 for the new SU prices w.r.t. ψ s1,s2 for the original SU prices as in Table II, Table II and SUs joining the network only when incentives in prices are available. However, this model can be easily scaled to estimate the overall daily SU profit to the WSPs, by simply multiplying the SU profits obtained from a single BS in a day with the total number of BSs owned by the WSP.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a methodology for achieving noncooperative competitive yet dynamic SU pricing, based on a novel BS-centric distributed framework. The framework and methodology described in this paper demonstrates the profitability potential to the WSPs from SU access based on the distributed framework. The final competitive dynamic SU price set by the BS for direct temporary wireless access to the SUs can be observed to depend upon the wireless environment, the SUF at the BS, current PU demand and the PU price.
